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ON ST. ISAAC THE SYRIAN’S ARGUMENT AGAINST
DIVINE RETRIBUTION
Jordan Wessling

Many theists maintain that God punishes humans retributively, whereby God
intentionally harms those punished as their sins deserve, without also aiming qua punishment to contribute to the immediate or ultimate flourishing of
those punished, or to the flourishing of some third (human) party. By contrast,
St. Isaac the Syrian in effect contends that such an understanding of divine
retribution is incompatible with a plausible understanding of God’s initial
creative purposes of love and is thus untrue. In this paper, I present and substantially build upon Isaac’s contention, and I defend the resulting developed
argument as a good argument worthy of further consideration.

Many religious theists maintain that God punishes humans retributively.
According to one way of understanding this teaching, God punishes individuals, with a fitting level of severity, primarily for the guilt accrued by
past sins, and this punishment (qua punishment) need not, and regularly
does not, aim to enhance the good or flourishing of those punished, but
instead may be positively bad for the subjects of punishment. Christian
theists, specifically, have often relied upon the noted understanding of
retributive punishment to justify certain versions of the doctrine of hell
as well as the atonement.1 Such a divine retributivist view, however, is
neither the perspective of all religious theists in general, nor Christian theists in particular. On the contrary, the repudiation of the claim that God
exercises this kind of retribution has a long history in Christian thought.
One particularly outspoken Christian critic of the notion that God
punishes retributively in the sense described is St. Isaac the Syrian (also
known as St. Isaac of Nineveh). Isaac was a seventh century monk who
remains widely respected among Eastern Christian communities (even
among those who are otherwise splintered), but is relatively unknown in

Regarding the doctrine of hell, see Adams, “Hell and the God of Justice,” 433–447, and
Clark, “God is Great, God is Good,” 15–31. For a discussion of many of the relevant issues
regarding the atonement, see Crisp, “Non-Penal Substitution,” 419–433.
1
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the Christian West today, despite the fact that he enjoyed an extensive
readership in the West during the 13th–15th centuries.2 Given the pastoral
and exhortative purposes of many of his writings, Isaac does not normally
structure arguments in a rigorous and systematic fashion. Nevertheless,
careful attention to his writings yield a handful of perceptive arguments
against the teaching that God punishes with the relevant form of retribution. In this paper, I examine and substantially extend one of these arguments, specifically one in which Isaac contends that the idea that God
punishes humans with retribution (along the lines described) is incompatible with God’s initial creative purposes of love, and is thus untrue. I label
the resulting Isaac-inspired version of the relevant argument the Argument
from God’s Purposes (henceforth the AGP), and I defend the AGP as a good
argument that merits further discussion.
The development and defense of the AGP is rolled out in three main
sections. In the first section, I lay the foundation for the AGP. This I do by
examining one of Isaac’s arguments against divine retribution, collecting
various conceptual resources from Isaac in the process. In gathering these
resources from Isaac, I repeatedly supply added theses when judged necessary, all the while attempting to make it clear as to when I am expositing Isaac and when I am adding my own principles.3 In this first section,
moreover, I draw principally from a set of interlocking and sequentially
unfolding chapters (i.e., chs. 38–40) from a compilation of Isaac’s essays
referred to as “The Second Part.”4 Due to limitations of space, I am unable
to situate Isaac in his historical context, nor engage the secondary literature on him, in a way that would satisfy the historian. Instead, as I unpack
Isaac’s argument, I regularly make direct appeals to Isaac’s writings as a
means of providing some evidence that my reading is on the right track,
2
For a succinct overview of Isaac’s ancient and contemporary influence, see Scully, Isaac of
Nineveh’s Ascetical Eschatology, xiv–xvii.
3
For the development of the AGP, I utilize what might be deemed a rational reconstruction of an argument Isaac presses against the teaching that God punishes humans with
retribution. The “rational reconstruction” I have in mind is the project of building upon, and
presenting in a more rigorous and contemporary way, a form of reasoning found in Isaac.
Among other things, such a reconstruction includes taking note of explicit claims and modes
of reasoning found in Isaac, locating and stating relevant implicit assumptions apparently
used by Isaac, adding additional theses to what Isaac says in the effort to strengthen his
reasoning, and integrating all of the results of these procedures into the presentation of
an argument that is potentially helpful for those who wish to consider divine punishment
today. At minimum, the intent is for the ensuing rational reconstruction of Isaac’s argument,
the AGP, to be in keeping with the spirit, even if not the letter, of Isaac’s original argument.
4
“The Second Part” is a collection of writings that, though lost for a time, was rediscovered by Sebastian Brock in 1983 and published by him in translated form twelve years
later. (For more on the finding of the second part of Isaac’s writings, see the following two
works by Sebastian Brock: “Isaac of Ninevah” and “Lost and Found.”) This compilation is
comprised of prayers, sermons, theological papers, and the like, and is so named because it
constitutes the second portion of Isaac’s better known, The Ascetical Homilies of St Isaac the
Syrian.
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even if such appeals are not demonstrative.5 In the second section of this
article, I present and defend the AGP. The AGP is essentially a systematic
presentation of the teachings and modes of reasoning underscored in the
preceding section of this paper, although the manner in which I articulate
and defend the AGP in this second section culls additional resources from
Isaac as well as unrelated writings (contemporary and otherwise). Finally,
in the third section, I present one salient philosophical-theological objection to the AGP, and I mine Isaac’s writings for aid in considering how one
might attempt to rebut this objection.
I. Isaac’s Argument Against Divine Retribution
Like many contemporary Christian theologians and philosophers of religion, Isaac maintains that God’s fundamental motivation for creating and
guiding the affairs of humans is that of love.6 In his view, “Among all
[God’s] actions there is none which is not entirely a matter of mercy, love,
and compassion: this constitutes the beginning and the end of His dealings with us.”7 Elsewhere Isaac elaborates,
With what purpose and with what love did He create this world and bring
it into existence! What a mystery does the coming into being of this creation look towards! To what state is (our) common nature invited! What love
served to initiate the creation of the world! [. . .] In love did [God] bring
the world into existence; in love is He going to bring it to that wondrous
transformed state, and in love will the world be swallowed up in the great
mystery of Him who has performed all these things; in love will the whole
course of governance of creation be finally comprised. [. . .] With this design
did He bring [rational beings] into existence [. . .].8

Isaac is clear. God creates and guides humanity—indeed the whole
world—out of love.
The claim that God is motivated primarily9 by love to create and guide
humans can be understood in two fundamental ways. It can be taken to
5
For what it is worth, many of the central features of my reading of Isaac are in step with
recent treatments of the general contours of Isaac’s theology. See, e.g., Alfeyev, The Spiritual
World of Isaac the Syrian, 35–48, 283–297; and Hagman, The Asceticism of Isaac of Ninevah,
197–204.
6
On Isaac’s views on creation, see Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 35–60.
7
II/39, 22. All quotes taken from Isaac of Nineveh (Isaac the Syrian), “The Second Part,”
Chapters IV–XLI, translated by Sebastian Brock.
8
II/38, 1–2.
9
It is not entirely clear to me whether Isaac means to commit himself to the notion that God
is motivated wholly by love in creating and guiding humans, or primarily by love in these ways.
Because little of substance turns on which Isaac prefers for the purposes of this article, I speak
of Isaac affirming the claim that God is motivated primarily or principally by love in creating
and guiding humans. Additionally, in this context, when I say that God is primarily or principally
motivated by love in the noted ways, I have in mind the notion that God’s loving motive is
lexically ordered over other concerns—that is, even if God has other concerns that do or might
factor into His dealings with us, His love is absolutely prioritized over these other concerns.
Isaac appears to affirm at least this much, albeit implicitly. (Thanks goes to Mark Murphy for
suggesting a clarification along these lines on what “primarily” in this context means.)
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mean that God is motivated by love to create and guide the collection or
whole of all humans, or these creative and providential purposes can be
understood to concern each and every human being, individually. I suspect that Isaac would want to affirm both ideas, insofar as each of these
options is deemed an expression of divine creativity which is thereby worthy of God’s affection.10 Regardless, Isaac is almost certainly committed to
the teaching that God is deeply concerned with individual creatures, and
that each and every human is produced and continuously providentially
guided by divine love. For example, in the context of considering God’s
motivation for creating, Isaac writes that God “has a single ranking of
complete and impassible love towards everyone [i.e., every rational creature], and he has a single caring concern for those who have fallen, just
as much as for those who have not fallen.”11 That God’s love is directed
towards everyone, including those who have fallen and those who have
not, indicates that Isaac understands God’s loving care to extend to each
individual human, and not that which is reducible to a love for some set
or group of humans. Indeed, God provides for “all created things in His
immeasurable compassion,” and, echoing the language of Luke 15:7, Isaac
claims that the Heavens rejoice “at a single sinner who repents,” whether
that sinner be a human or even a demon.12
As Isaac sees it, the God who is primarily motivated by love in His
dealings with humans would not entertain the idea of punishing humans
retributively. In fact, it is “abominable” to “suppose that retribution for
evil acts is to be found in [God].”13 What, precisely, Isaac means by “retribution” is not something that he spells out entirely, however. But the
way in which Isaac speaks of retribution reveals that he has in mind that
which is relevantly similar to the rather strong characterization of retributive punishment that began this article. As shall become clear, Isaac specifically objects to the idea that God punishes (and hence harms, in some
sense) individuals primarily for the guilt accrued by past sins in a manner
which is not also aimed towards the good of those punished.14
Isaac, so far as I know, never considers the option that love might drive
God to punish some humans in ways that are positively bad for them, but
good for others. He never entertains the idea that, say, God might punish
the guilty principally to keep them from hurting the innocent, to deter
others from committing self-harming evils, or to communicate to victims
that their victimization will not be tolerated (again, as far as I am aware).
Instead, Isaac appears to assume that God need not choose between love
of the guilty and love of the innocent in His punitive acts. The assumption, though substantive, is not an implausible one. Given omniscience,
God probably can figure out ways to punish that are beneficial, or may
See, e.g., II/10, 18–19, 24; II/38, 1–3.
II/40, 3; cf. II/38, 5.
12
II/40, 7.
13
II/39, 2.
14
See II/39, passim.
10
11

ST. ISAAC THE SYRIAN AGAINST DIVINE RETRIBUTION

117

in principle be beneficial, to all of those who are pertinently impacted.15
Whatever the case, the relevant argument from Isaac is not directed
against those who say that God must punitively harm some exclusively
or primarily for the sake of others. Rather, Isaac aims to demonstrate the
falsity of the teaching that God punishes humans retributively in the sense
just described. But almost certainly, Isaac would also object to the idea that
God punitively harms the guilty solely or primarily for the sake of the
innocent. Thus, in order to give Isaac’s form of reasoning a broader reach,
we shall extend Isaac’s objection to retribution to include those who might
modify the doctrine of divine retribution along the noted zero-sum lines.
With all that in mind, and in the attempt to unearth and expand upon
some of the key ideas to which Isaac objects, we might understand the
kind of retribution with which Isaac takes issue to be relevantly similar to
“strong-retribution.”
Strong-retribution: A form of punishment (i) that aims to punish, with
the fitting level of severity, those who deserve it on account of their past
misconduct, principally because they deserve it, (ii) that does not aim
intrinsically, qua punishment, to promote the flourishing of those punished (e.g., by helping them reform), and (iii) that it is not performed
principally because it is likely to bring about the immediate or ultimate flourishing of the one punished or the flourishing of some third
(human) party.16
In what follows, I speak of God visiting or inflicting (and similar terms)
strong-retribution on some individual when God is presented as punishing that individual in a manner that meets the specifications found
in strong-retribution. For ease of expression, moreover, unless otherwise
indicated I write in the remainder of this article as if all of Isaac’s uses of
“retribution” and like terms refer to “strong-retribution” (although, again,
Isaac nowhere states and objects to such a precise principle; at most what
may be said is that the rejection of such a principle is entailed by the various claims that Isaac affirms). So configured, Isaac’s contention (in effect)
is that God does not inflict strong-retribution on humans (or any rational
creature, for that matter).
We should not suppose that God visits strong-retribution on humans,
Isaac maintains, since the infliction of this punishment would be incompatible with God’s love of those humans punished in this manner. For
were God to inflict strong-retribution on some human, He would be
administering a primarily “backward-looking” form of punishment (i.e.,
15
Relevant here is my “How Does a Loving God Punish?” as well as my “A Love that
Speaks in Harsh Tones.”
16
This third condition is added to account for the perspective that retribution is morally
justified on account of past wrongdoing, but that one should typically exercise retribution
only when it is likely to have some positive outcome in the life of the one punished or in
another’s life, even when such retribution is not intrinsically directed towards these positive
outcomes.
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punishment based upon the guilt accrued through past failings, and
not on what might benefit this or some other human). But such a form
of punishment would not be taking into account the “forward-looking”
goals of love, which aim to promote the flourishing of those loved. Isaac
explains, here using “requital” as a synonym for “retribution,”17 specifically strong-retribution:
So then, let us not attribute to God’s actions and His dealings with us any
idea of requital. Rather, we should speak of fatherly provision, a wise dispensation, a perfect will which is concerned with our good, and complete love.
If it is a case of love, then it is not one of requital; and if it is a case of requital,
then it is not one of love. Love, when it operates, is not concerned with the
requiting of former things [. . .]; rather, it looks to what is most advantageous
in the future: it examines what is to come, and not things that are past.18

In another place, Isaac submits that divine punishment, being an expression of love, is specifically directed towards the correction and reformation of the guilty.
God chastises with love, not for the sake of revenge—far be it!—but in seeking to make whole His image. And [God] does not harbor wrath until such
time as correction is no longer possible, for He does not seek vengeance for
Himself. This is the aim of love. Love’s chastisement is for correction, but
does not aim at retribution.19

So, were God to inflict strong-retribution on some human, this would be
incompatible with divine love because the former unlike the latter does
not include the goal of promoting (or at least not substantially diminishing) the flourishing of the one punished.
To dig a bit deeper into the nature of this ostensible incompatibility, the
tension that Isaac identifies between God’s love and the supposition that
God visits strong-retribution on persons appears to rest upon what I shall
call “intentional-harm.”
Intentional-harm. One performs an act, A, that amounts to an instance
of intentional-harm of some person,20 P, if the following conditions are
jointly fulfilled: (i) A causes P to suffer, or otherwise diminishes P’s
flourishing; (ii) A is performed in order to cause P to suffer or otherwise to diminish P’s flourishing, primarily because P’s suffering or the
diminishment of P’s flourishing is deemed to be deserved, intrinsically
valuable, and/or found pleasurable by the one inflicting A on P; and,
finally, (iii) A is not intrinsically directed towards contributing to P’s
See, II/39, 16.
II/39, 17.
19
I/48 (230) = PR 45 (323). Cited in Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 40–41.
Elsewhere Isaac eschews the notion that divine punishment is “brought about in order to
requite past actions”; rather, “all” of God’s punishments are “for the sake of the subsequent
gain to be gotten in them [i.e., those punished]” (II/39, 15).
20
For convenience, I here limit the discussion to the intentional-harm of persons, rather
than, say, sentient beings more generally.
17
18
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immediate or ultimate flourishing or to the flourishing of some third
(human) party, nor is A performed principally because A is likely to
bring about P’s immediate or ultimate flourishing or the flourishing of
some third (human) party.
Isaac certainly does not explicitly state or argue against any thesis that
is quite like intentional-harm. Nevertheless, I postulate intentional-harm
as that which contains a network of ideas that undoubtedly would be
opposed by Isaac, and which undergirds the kind of teaching on divine
punishment to which Isaac objects.21 As with strong-retribution, I will
speak of God visiting or inflicting intentional-harm (and like locutions) on
some individual if God, according to the description at issue, treats that
individual in a manner that satisfies the conditions embedded in intentional-harm. Additionally, I subsequently write as if Isaac directly objects
to intentional-harm, even though Isaac nowhere contends with such a
developed thesis on harming individuals.
Suppose God inflicts strong-retribution on some human. Given the provided characterization of intentional-harm, plus the plausible assumption
that God’s visitation of strong-retribution on someone includes God’s successfully acting in order to cause that individual to suffer or to diminish
that individual’s flourishing (minimally, by removing some relevant good
from that person), it follows that inflicting strong-retribution on a human
includes inflicting intentional-harm on that individual. For once it is agreed
that divine instances of strong-retribution include God intentionally harming persons—by intentionally causing them to suffer or by diminishing
their flourishing, primarily because it is deserved and not also principally
to bring about the noted forward-looking benefits—God is envisioned as
harming persons in a manner that amounts to intentional-harm. However,
as Isaac would have us see it, God’s inflicting of intentional-harm on some
person contradicts God’s love for that individual. This is because loving
someone entails promoting that individual’s highest available good or type
of flourishing (“what is most advantageous”),22 when the opportunity to do
so feasibly arises, and, crucially, not visiting intentional-harm on the beloved
individual. Hence, if God punishes someone whom He loves in a manner
that amounts to intentional-harm, as God would be via strong-retribution,
God would be punishing that individual in opposition to His love for her.23
But why think that God would not occasionally punish in opposition to His love, especially given the weight of human sin? As intimated
already, one significant answer by Isaac to such a question has to do with
his conception of why God choose to create, and consequently govern,
humans in the first place. Specifically, if God, before humans ever existed,
21
In various places, for instance, Isaac reasons against claims to the effect that God is in
the business of “bringing us to perdition and disaster” on behalf of the conclusion that God
punishes for the benefit of those punished (II/39, 15).
22
II/39, 17.
23
See, e.g., II/39, 2–7, 15–21.
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was principally motivated by love in His decision to create and providentially guide humans, then God would not be driven off His predetermined
course of love in His punishments—as would be the case were God to
inflict strong-retribution on sinful humans.
Isaac offers a number of reasons on behalf of the inference from God’s
initial loving motivation for creating and guiding humans to the exclusion
of God inflicting strong-retribution. Here we focus our attention on just one
primary justification that Isaac offers for this inference, namely, that which
comes from God’s omniscience and the perfect practical rationality, or meansend reasoning, derived therefrom. Considering the following example:
It is not (the way of) the compassionate Maker to create rational beings in
order to deliver them over mercilessly to unending affliction (in punishment)
for things of which He knew even before they were fashioned, (aware) how
they would turn out when He created them—and whom (nonetheless) He
created. [. . .] Such action does not belong to the Creator who, even before
the cycle of the depiction of the universe has been portrayed, knew of all
that was before and all that was after in connection with the actions and
intentions of rational beings.24

In the passage cited, Isaac refers to and rejects the notion that God punishes without end in hell. However, Isaac elsewhere uses similar reasoning
to indicate, in effect, that God would not inflict any form of strong-retribution on a person.25 For example, in speaking generally about divine retribution, Isaac contends that we cannot “believe of God that He would have
done something out of retribution for anticipated evil acts in connection
with those whose nature He has brought into being with honour and great
love.” 26 Similarly, in another place, Isaac says that “God’s caring is guiding us all the time to what He wishes for us,” namely our “future good,”
even “cunningly” and covertly using His foreknowledge to arrange the
harms that befall us “for our advantage.”27 And since God created every
human in love, even while knowing they would turn astray, it would be a
“childish view of the Creator” to suppose that “after what He had established had become corrupted against His will [by human sin], He devised
some other plan, preparing ills in return for its corruption. Such are the
feeble ways of understanding the Creator!”28
Behind these instances of reasoning resides the supposition that when
God decided to create and guide humans, He did so while foreknowing
all facts concerning human wrongdoing. And yet, God’s decision to create and guide humans was principally motivated by love. However, Isaac
believes it would be absurd for God to decide, primarily motivated by
II/39, 6. All textual insertions within parentheses come from Brock’s translation of Isaac’s
“The Second Part.”
25
See II/39, 2–5.
26
II/39, 2.
27
II/39, 5.
28
II/39, 17.
24
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love, to create and guide humans, only to abandon that loving decision
once humans misbehave as He knew they would when He originally
formed said loving decision. Such a conflict of purposes “characterizes
people who do not know or who are unaware of what they are doing,”29
but not the omniscient God who, “with a love that cannot be measured,”
established the world, and each human within it.30
Clearly, Isaac’s argument rests upon the fundamental claim that God’s
motivation for creating and guiding humans is love, a motivation that
has tangible implications for how God deals with humans when they sin.
Though Isaac never unpacks in detail what it means to be motivated by
love to create humans, here the love is perhaps best viewed as anticipatory. Since humans do not exist prior to God’s choice to create, God creates
humans for the sake of love, that is, so that humans might flourish and ultimately have the joy of being united to God in love.31 This, or some doctrine
relevantly similar to this, is why God creates humans, according to Isaac.
On a reasonable reconstruction of Isaac’s thinking, then, God’s creating
each human primarily for the sake of love ensures that God never visits
intentional-harm on any human. Such intentional-harm is incompatible
with God’s creative and providential purposes, and, for reasons that shall
be discussed in the next two sections, Isaac maintains that there is nothing
about the divine character that demands inflicting intentional-harm on sinful humans. On the contrary, Isaac assumes that God possesses the ingenuity and motivation to punish humans in benevolent, remedial ways.32
With something like these assumptions in place, Isaac attempts to
demonstrate that God’s loving motivations regarding creation preclude
God from visiting strong-retribution on individuals. For when God considers whether or not to create humans, and for what reasons He might do
so, He does this with all facts before Him, including all foreknown facts
relevant to human sin. Yet, despite foreknowing the depth of human sin
prior to His choice to create, God decides to create humans principally for
the sake of love, together with the intention to promote and act consistently with each human’s flourishing whenever doing so is feasible.33 But
since it is always feasible for God not to punish humans with strong-retribution, God never punishes in this manner. Quite the opposite, God punishes only when the loving aim of correction is included.

II/39, 6.
II/10, 19.
31
See, in particular, II/38, 1–2; cf. 1/71 (345–346) = PR 74 (509–510); II/5, 8; Gnostic Chapters
IV, 78. More specifically, Isaac envisions a kind of deified union between God and creature,
where the human grows to resemble God and participate in His life. Unfortunately, we cannot
discuss Isaac’s thinking on this matter. However, see the listed references for some of Isaac’s
thinking on this topic as well as Alfeyev’s The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 56–60.
32
E.g., II/39, 17–22.
33
Throughout this article, descriptions of God knowing or doing something prior to some
event should be understood in terms of logical or explanatory priority; such descriptions are
not intended to indicate (or deny) that God is temporal or “in” time.
29
30
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Of course, Isaac is aware that certain biblical passages, specifically in
the Old Testament, seem to depict God as one who inflicts strong-retribution on humans. But Isaac insists that such passages must be interpreted in
light of the loving character of Christ, which Isaac affirms as incompatible
with strong-retribution. “Tell me,” Isaac asks rhetorically, “if God is someone who requites (evil), and He does what He does by means of requital,
what commensurate requital do you see here [in Christ], O man? Show
me.”34 No, Christ reveals God to be a Benevolent Father who, though mysterious and fearsome in certain respects, always punishes as a redemptive
“Life-giver.”35 Unfortunately, Isaac does not engage in the kind of detailed
biblical exegesis of this issue for which one might hope.
Isaac follows his reasoning to its perceived natural end. If God does not
execute strong-retribution on humans, but always punishes with the goal of
correcting and redeeming sinners, then punishment in hell similarly must
be ordered towards redemption. This is a conclusion which Isaac embraces,
envisioning hell as purgatorial. There sinners are chastised in love (“scourged
by the scourge of love”)36 so that hell’s inhabitants “will be perfected in love
for Him” and thereby “partake of the divine outpouring which the blessed
Creator is preparing in His grace.”37 In fact, Isaac takes things a step further
and affirms universalism, the doctrine that all will eventually be saved.38 The
“all” here refers to every rational creature, “not even the immense wickedness of the demons can overcome the measure of God’s goodness.”39
Note, however, that a broadly remedial view of divine punishment
does not obviously require universal salvation. Against a definitively universalist outcome, for instance, many have argued that if, in love, God has
granted creatures a measure of (libertarian) freedom that He will not override, then it is possible that some will simply choose to cling to their sins,
and thereby forever frustrate God’s saving purposes for them.40 If such an
option is viable, then one can maintain with Isaac that divine punishment
is partially or wholly comprised of remedial aims without also committing oneself to the controversial doctrine of universalism.
The focus of this article, however, is not with an examination of divine
punishment and things to come per se, but with the Isaac-inspired
AGP, directed against the notion that God inflicts strong-retribution
II/39, 15; cf. II/39, 19–23.
II/39, 23.
36
I/28 (141) = PR 27 (201–202). Quote taken from Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the
Syrian, 281.
37
II/40, 4.
38
Minimally, many commentators on Isaac understand him to affirm universal salvation.
See: Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 283–302; Hagman, The Asceticism of Isaac of
Ninevah, 197–212; Hryniewicz, “Universalism of Salvation,” 139–150; Ramelli, The Christian
Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 758–766; and Ware, “Dare We Hope for the Salvation of All?,” 193–216.
39
Here Isaac quotes, with approval, “the blessed” Bishop of Tarsus, Diodore (II/39, 13).
40
The following works are here relevant: Buckareff and Plug, “Escaping Hell,” 39–54;
Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell, ch. 4; Ragland, “Love and Damnation,” 206–224.
34
35
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on humans. We shall therefore leave the discussion about universalism
aside, and focus instead on the logically separable AGP, which amounts
to something like a more formal and systematic presentation of the ideas
thus far canvassed.
II. The AGP
We are now in a position to consider the AGP. Relying upon the aforementioned notions of intentional-harm and strong-retribution, the argument
may be stated as follows.
(1) God’s primary motivation for creating and guiding each human
is love despite foreknowing all facts about human sin prior to this
choice to create.
(2)	If God’s primary motivation for creating and guiding each human
is love despite foreknowing all facts about human sin prior to this
choice to create, then God never inflicts intentional-harm on any
human.
(3)	If God never inflicts intentional-harm on any human, then God
never punishes humans with strong-retribution.
Therefore,
(4) God never punishes humans with strong-retribution.
If the AGP is sound, in the spirit of Isaac we may uphold a general teaching
about divine punishment, specifically, that God does not inflict strong-retribution on any human at any time. There is, moreover, a good case to be
made that each of the premises of the AGP can be reasonably affirmed. We
shall examine these premises in order.
The first premise, (1), is comprised of two theological theses. One of these
is that God foreknows all facts about human sin prior to His decision to
create. Recall, for Isaac, the importance of this theological thesis is to plant
within his readers’ minds the notion that God’s creation of humans primarily
for the sake of love was done with eyes wide open to the horrors of human
evil, including the evil He would or could punish. This focus on God’s foreknowledge, in turn, sets the stage for reason to think that God would not first
create humans primarily for the sake of love, only to adopt an additional and
opposing motivational structure once humans sin as God knew they would.
Understandably, Isaac does not discuss the nature of this divine knowledge with the level of precision and detail that has become customary
within the contemporary philosophical literature on divine foreknowledge.
It is fairly clear that Isaac simply assumes the now controversial claims that
God can foreknow future contingents, and, also, that God can obtain this
information prior to His decision to create.41 However, the relevant theological thesis within (1) does not require one to maintain that God foreknows
Relevant here is Sanders, The God Who Risks, 205–217; and Zimmerman, “The Providential
Usefulness of ‘Simple Foreknowledge,’” 174–196.
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future creational contingents in this manner. Instead, one could perhaps
hold that God knows, prior to the decision to create, all possibilities—and
where available probabilities—regarding human evil, and yet God still
decides, principally motivative by love, to create and providentially govern
humans. Such an understanding of divine knowledge would be consistent
with open theism and the position sometimes called “simple foreknowledge,” and it provides a viable (even if contestable) interpretation of the
claim found within (1) that God foreknows all facts about human sin prior to
His choice to create humans.42 In order to circumvent gratuitous objections
to the AGP based upon divine foreknowledge, we shall keep in mind for the
remainder of this essay the number of ways in which the thesis within (1)
pertaining to divine foreknowledge can be interpreted.
The second theological thesis embedded within (1) is that God’s
primary motivation for creating and providentially guiding humans
is love. Isaac likely inherited this conviction from the Syriac Christian
theological tradition in which he stands, a tradition that places an
emphasis on divine love.43 But, of course, many Christian traditions
place a premium on God’s love, and it is not the case that only Syrian
Christians are inclined to believe that love is God’s primary motivation for creating and providentially guiding humans. On the contrary,
many Christian theologians and philosophers, both past and present,
explicitly affirm this theological thesis. In addition, the Syriac Christian
tradition is not the only probable influence on Isaac’s thinking on God’s
principle motivational stance concerning creation. The loving ministry
of God-in-Christ looms large in Isaac’s thought, and informs the way in
which Isaac sees God.44 It is plausible that Isaac implicitly deems God’s
love in Christ as providing more support (albeit indirect) for the thesis
that God’s dealings with creation are primarily motivated by love than
it does any viable competing hypothesis.45 Whether or not Isaac reasons
in precisely this way, I have defended something close to this reasoning
elsewhere.46 Interested readers are directed to that defense should they
be skeptical of it. Apart from that defense, this second theological thesis
of (1) has been ably defended by several contemporary theologians and
philosophers.47 Based upon such forms of argumentation, many will
conclude that this second theological thesis within (1) is more plausible
This interpretation is especially plausible if one holds that the only relevant facts prior
to God’s choice to create concern possibilities, and perhaps probabilities, about what humans
might freely do—i.e., at that logical moment, there are no facts (yet) about what exactly
humans freely will do or would do in discrete circumstances.
43
See, Brock, “St. Isaac of Nineveh and Syriac Spirituality,” 84.
44
For a summary, see Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 49–60, as well as Unger,
“The Love of God the Primary Reason for the Incarnation According to Isaac of Nineveh.” Cf.
Isaac’s II/39, 15–16; II/40, 12.
45
See, especially, Isaac’s Gnostic Chapters, IV, 78.
46
Wessling, Love Divine, 76–113 and 200–206.
47
For a representative sample, see Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, 119–130; Kvanvig, The
Problem of Hell, 112–119; Moltmann, God in Creation, 73–76.
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than its denial. And, while this second theological thesis certainly has its
detractors, with Isaac we shall assume the truth of it in what follows.48
So, given the apparent plausibility of the two theological theses of (1),
let us proceed on the assumption that (1) is true. But (2) is quite plausible once (1) is granted. (Recall that (2) is the following premise: if God’s
primary motivation for creating and guiding each human is love despite
foreknowing all facts about human sin prior to this choice to create, then
God never inflicts intentional-harm on any human.) For suppose, as found
within (1), that God, with eyes wide open to the depth and expanse of
human sinfulness that would (or possibly/plausibly would) transpire, creates humans for the primary purpose of loving them and guiding them in
accordance with that love. Such a divine motivation for creating humans,
we here assume with Isaac and with a great measure of independent plausibility, entails that God sets as His primary purpose concerning humans
the aim of bringing about the flourishing and (ultimately) the highest
good of each human (namely, loving union with Himself). If this is so,
it seems fairly natural to presume that God is committed never to inflict
intentional-harm on a human. In other words, it seems that God simply
would not opt for a course of action that contravenes His initial loving
purposes for creation, as would be the case were God to inflict intentional-harm on some human, given that He selected these purposes when He
had all requisite knowledge before Him to avoid such colliding aims.
Drawing from what Joseph Raz calls exclusionary reasons provides
another way of thinking about (2).49 Exclusionary reasons are second-order reasons that exclude certain first-order reasons to act; they are, in other
words, second-order reasons that dictate that certain first-order reasons
should not factor at all into one’s decision to perform some action. For
instance, commands from an appropriate authority regularly provide reasons for specific actions that exclude opposing reasons derived from mere
personal preference. Because a sergeant in the armed forces commands
a private to rise for training early in the morning, the private has a second-order reason not to act on her (reasons-generating) desire to catch a
bit of extra sleep. Promises provide another example. If Gary promises
Allison that he will pick her up from the airport on Friday, he generates
for himself a second-order reason totally to disregard whatever minor
excuses he might find not to pick up Allison that Friday (e.g., he would
rather watch television or enjoy a leisurely meal). Finally, it is plausible
that standing in certain relationships or fulfilling particular roles to others
can generate a consistent set of exclusionary reasons as well. Standing in
the relationship of being the parent of or being the caretaker of young children,
for example, often generates a pattern of second-order reasons to ignore
By far, the most powerful criticism of which I am aware of (1)’s second theological thesis
is found in Jonathan Edwards’s The Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the
World. See my Love Divine, 76–113, for some of my objections to Edwards’s views on this matter.
49
See, Practical Reason and Norms.
48
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one’s own inclinations and preferences that run contrary to the safety and
wellbeing of the relevant children. Sometimes these exclusionary reasons
can be experienced as burdensome, but they need not be. It is relatively
easy to imagine a perfect parent who loves his children so deeply that
the exclusionary reasons related to the care of his children are internal
to his love and not experienced as an external imposition, at least not
routinely so.
The obvious differences aside, God’s creation of each human for the
sake of love can be viewed as analogous to fulfilling the role of parent
to all humanity. In the very act of creating humans for the sake of love,
that is, God generates for Himself a pattern of second-order reasons
for protecting and promoting the flourishing of each human—which, if
not driven off course, eventuates in union with Himself—that excludes
certain first-order reasons for action that would otherwise compete.
Such exclusionary reasons would not be burdensome on God. On the
contrary, from a perspective similar to that of Isaac’s, God is unambiguously and steadfastly committed to His choice to create humans for
the sake of love, a choice made with full awareness of the sins humans
would (or might) perpetrate. All the same, God’s loving motivation
for creating and guiding humans sets certain parameters on how He
will subsequently evaluate reasons for acting within creation. He now
has exclusionary reasons not to act on certain kinds of reasons that are
opposed to a human’s flourishing. Minimally, God has exclusionary reason not to act on reasons that would amount to visiting intentional-harm
on one or more humans.
It should be clear, then, how Raz’s exclusionary reasons can be used to
inform (2). Should God decide to create and guide humans primarily for
the sake of love, despite knowing the depth and scope of human sinfulness
prior to this decision, then God, by the very nature of the case, has exclusionary reason not to act on reasons that entail inflicting intentional-harm
on any human. Of course, God’s having such an exclusionary reason does
not imply that He would not sometimes cause or allow humans to suffer.
What (2) implies when read in light of Raz’s idea of exclusionary reasons
is that God would not act on any reasons He might have to visit intentional-harm on humans. But refusing to act on such reasons does not preclude
God from causing a human to suffer in order to benefit her or another, for
example.
Here is another way of getting at the main ideas behind (2). Jonathan
Edwards refers to a chief end for which God creates humans (and the world
more generally).50 Such an end constitutes the most significant reason for
which God creates humans, and this end is supposed to inform and order
all other divine goals vis-à-vis humans. Minimally, all actions that God
performs concerning humans are supposed to realize the chief end in
some way, and no divine action concerning humans should contradict or
Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World.
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otherwise thwart the achievement of God’s chief end. (2) can be seen to
refer to a kind of chief end, only the kind of chief end referenced in (2) may
be held to be less totalizing than the Edwardsian understanding of the
concept. The kind of chief end referenced in (2) may be judged to be less
totalizing than the Edwardsian understanding of a chief end because (2)
does not commit one to the teaching that every act God performs regarding humans in some way realizes, and never departs from, the chief end
of divine-human loving union, and the subsidiary ways of human flourishing connected thereto. What is required, rather, is a certain perspective
on God’s primary motivation for creating and governing humans as well
as one action-type that such a motivation precludes. Although less totalizing than an Edwardsian chief end in that respect, the noted doctrine in
(2) concerning God’s purposes obviously has implications for the kinds
of endeavors God will take up and the actions He is willing to perform.
Specifically, given the loving motives God adopts concerning the chief
end for humans, God will not visit intentional-harm on humans.
Talk about exclusionary reasons and chief ends aside, the basic idea
embedded within (2) should be clear enough. To suppose that the omniscient God decides once and for all to create and guide humans principally
motivated by His love is not a mere sentimental teaching. Rather, it is a
teaching that offers a framework for thinking about divine action. In the
present case, what is relevant is that the God who creates humans for the
sake of love is committed never to inflict intentional-harm on humans,
sinful or otherwise.
(3), it will be remembered, is the premise that if God never inflicts
intentional-harm on any human, then God never punishes humans with
strong-retribution. The premise is analytically true, once it is agreed that
God’s inflicting of strong-retribution on humans entails that God inflicts
intentional-harm on those punished, as discussed in the previous section.
So, if the first portion of the premise regarding the visitation of divine
intentional-harm is right, then it follows that God does not visit strong-retribution on humans. Thus, (3) appears to be true.
But if (3) is accepted, then, supposing one accepts the other premises
as well, (4) follows. In that case, one should join Isaac in maintaining (in
effect) that God does not punish humans with strong-retribution. God,
as it were, has exclusionary reason not to consider punishing humans in
ways that amount to intentional-harm (e.g., strong-retribution), given His
primary creative and providential purposes. Alternatively put, because
God’s chief end regarding the creation of humans is the achievement of
their highest good, specifically loving union with Himself, God never
punishes in ways that are diametrically opposed to the advancement of
this chief end, as would be the case if God punished with strong-retribution. For were God to adopt as His primary goal concerning humans
the realization of their highest good, while simultaneously adopting the
contradictory subsidiary goal of executing strong-retribution on sinful
humans, God would be putting Himself at cross-purposes with Himself.
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However, the perfectly intelligent God simply cannot be at cross-purposes
with Himself by choosing subsidiary goals that frustrate His ultimate purposes, provided that God is perfectly able to bring His primary and subsidiary goals into alignment, which Isaac assumes is feasible for God.
III. The Anselmian Objection
However, not everyone shares with Isaac the assumption that God is able
to punish in a manner that dovetails with God’s loving purposes. On the
contrary, perhaps the most significant objection to the AGP comes from
reliance on a kind of reasoning concerning divine retributive justice that, if
sound, undermines this very assumption. The relevant kind of reasoning
is often associated with Anselm of Canterbury, though it can be found in
other influential Christian theologians as well.51 Adapted for our purposes,
the reasoning can be stated as follows. Sin against the infinite and holy
God accrues an infinite demerit, and God simply cannot overlook offenses
to His honor. To do so would be to violate the fundamental demands of
justice, something God cannot do. Hence if God is not otherwise compensated, God simply must punish sinners in accordance with their demerit, at
least when the offenses are particularly grievous. Provided that one maintains that God’s punishing of sinners as their demerit warrants sometimes
amounts to a kind of divine strong-retribution (which is often assumed to
be the case by proponents of such an argument), this form of reasoning
contradicts the conclusion of the AGP.
Let us label this kind of reasoning that undergirds the conclusion that
God must punish humans with strong-retribution for uncompensated
sins the “Anselmian Paradigm.” Suppose that one accepts this paradigm,
specifically the idea that God, unless He is otherwise compensated, must
visit strong-retribution on humans for (significant) wrongdoing. This
Anselmian understanding of the divine nature when paired with (1), or
something like it, yields the following: God creates humans out of love,
or with the provisional intention of acting consistently with love for them,
yet God knows that He must punish humans who step out of line with
strong-retribution. Since creation is generated from a place of love for
humans, God, so to speak, always wants to be good to everyone, and all
things being equal He would be, but God also knows that justice requires
retribution of the kind that entails inflicting intentional-harm on some
humans, specifically strong-retribution. On this Anselmian Paradigm,
then, (1) is accepted (or something close to (1) is accepted), yet (2) is denied.
The most natural interpretation of the Anselmian Paradigm is one
in which God’s disposition to punish is modally strong. Minimally, it
seems, defenders of the paradigm should maintain, once (1) is adopted,
that God must punish sinners as they deserve for particularly grievous
51
E.g., Cur Deus Homo I, chaps. 11–5, 20, 25. Cf. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian
Religion, 2.16.1; and Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin I: II: III. See Eleonore Stump’s recent
discussion of the plausibility and influence of such a mode of reasoning in Atonement, ch. 3.
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uncompensated sins in all but very distant worlds. For if God’s requirement to punish humans with strong-retribution is based upon some contingent obstacle that might be removed with relative ease, then, given (1),
God should remove it so that He can carry on with His loving purposes.
But then (2) is not in danger of being contravened. In point of fact, moreover, recent defenders of the teaching that God must punish humans with
strong-retribution for uncompensated sins do apparently opt for something like this modally strong claim.52 For such reasons, we shall proceed
on the assumption that the defender of the Anselmian Paradigm who also
subscribes to (1) is best served by the noted strong modal claim, namely,
that God must, in perhaps all but very distant worlds, punish humans
with strong-retribution for uncompensated sins on account of His perfect
justice.
Isaac does not display awareness of anything like the Anselmian
Paradigm. This is not entirely surprising since Isaac lived before Anselm,
and because this paradigm, or a precursor to it, seems to have had less
influence on Isaac’s Eastern context.53 Nevertheless, Isaac’s descriptions
of the divine character imply a firm rejection of the notion that God must
visit strong-retribution on humans for uncompensated sins. Rather than
requiring compensation, “To anyone who shows just a little suffering and
will to compunction for what has occurred, to such a person immediately,
at once, without any delay, [God] will grant forgiveness for their sins.”54
More generally, it may be said that the Anselmian Paradigm is not just
incompatible with many of Isaac’s theological commitments, but also
considerably foreign to Isaac’s way of thinking. Nonetheless, considering
how Isaac might respond to the Anselmian Paradigm will perhaps furnish
E.g., Corlett, “Divine Justice and Human Sin,” 133–145, and Crisp, “Divine Retribution,”
35–52. A notable reconfiguration of something akin to what I am calling the Anselmian
Paradigm, complete with a modally weaker claim about the conditions under which God
might punish, is found in Richard Swinburne’s Responsibility and Atonement. There Swinburne
argues that God need not punish sinners to the degree deserved for serious and uncompensated transgressions, but that it would be inappropriate for God to forgive humans for
serious sins without minimally requiring repentance and apology (see 148 and 181–182).
But on Swinburne’s view it is good for the sinner for God to demand repentance and apology (and perhaps penance), and, crucially, Swinburne does not advocate anything relevantly
like divine strong-retribution (although his defended view of divine punishment might be
said to have its own shortcomings). The upshot is that it is difficult to see how Swinburne’s
modified Anselmian Paradigm provides special resources for a plausible objection to the
AGP. Mutatis mutandis, a similar conclusion holds for more recent modifications of what
might be recognized as broadly in keeping with the Anselmian Paradigm—e.g., William
Craig’s Atonement and the Death of Christ, Stephen Porter’s “Swinburnian Atonement and
the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” and Jada Twedt Strabbing’s “Divine Forgiveness and
Reconciliation.” Since I do not know of a modified form of the Anselmian Paradigm (along
with its modally weaker claim about divine punishment) that provides unique resources for
a plausible objection to the AGP, I shall discuss modifications of the Anselmian Paradigm
no further.
53
Relevant here is Lossky, “Redemption and Deification,” 97–110.
54
II/40, 14.
52
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the Isaac-inspired AGP with wider appeal—rather than merely leaving
things to rest at a clash of competing paradigms. To that end, two lines of
argumentation can be extrapolated from Isaac on behalf of the idea that
God’s punitive justice is not relevantly inexorable and that God is sometimes free to forgive those who repent.
Consider, first, the manner in which Isaac appeals to the ministry of
Christ on behalf of God’s forgiving nature.55 In response to the question,
“Will God, if I ask Him, forgive me these things by which I am pained
and by whose memory I am tormented, things by which, though I abhor
them, I go on backsliding?,” Isaac points to God’s various acts of mercy,
especially as that mercy is displayed by Christ. In Christ one finds that
“the right hand of our Lord is stretched out night and day, while he is on
the look out to support, comfort, and encourage everyone—especially to
see if he can find any who endure even just a little suffering and grief so
that their sins may be forgiven.”56 Stated in more general terms, Christ,
possessing the full character of God, manifested a ministry of love to the
point of being willing to die for his enemies, and he taught his followers to forgive freely those who repent (e.g., Matt. 18:21–35). Isaac in effect
maintains that Christ’s presentation of freely-given forgiveness does not
seem to fit well with the idea that God possesses a character of relevantly
inexorable strong-retributive justice. Indeed, one might take things a step
further and submit that Christ’s actions indicate that God sometimes forgives without any repentance. While being crucified, for example, Christ
is famously depicted as saying, “Father, forgive them; for they do not
know what they are doing” (Lk. 23:34).57 Whether or not this second step
is warranted, we may draw from Isaac the insight that the way Christ forgives seems to stand in tension with the kind of inexorable divine punitive
justice at issue.
A second response to the idea that God’s uncompensated punitive justice is inexorable comes from the manner in which Isaac attempts to elicit
certain intuitions about God’s moral character.58 Isaac regularly argues
from the lesser to the greater—specifically, from human moral goodness to
divine moral goodness—to argue that God would not visit what I am calling strong-retribution on anyone. Speaking of the disposition to exercise
such retribution, for instance, he says, “We cannot even believe such a thing
can be found in those human beings who live a virtuous and upright life
and whose thoughts are entirely in accord with the divine will—let alone
believe of God that He has done something out of retribution for anticipated
E.g., II/39, 15–16; and II/40, 14–16.
II/40, 15–17.
57
Biblical textual critics debate about whether Luke 23:34 belongs to the original gospel
account (for a discussion, see Ehrman, Studies in the Textual Criticism of the New Testament,
86–90), and theologians and philosophers debate about whether and when God’s forgiveness
of humans is conditioned about repentance (see, e.g., Tombs, “The Offer of Forgiveness,” and
Strabbing, “Divine Forgiveness and Reconciliation”).
58
E.g., II/39, 15–16.
55
56

ST. ISAAC THE SYRIAN AGAINST DIVINE RETRIBUTION

131

evil acts in connection with those whose nature He has brought into being
with honour and great love.”59 In place of such retributivist thinking, Isaac
submits, we should conceive of God as akin to, only greater than, a loving
Father, who always punishes for our benefit.60 It is easy to discern how one
might utilize similar thinking in order to reject the relevant kind of inexorable divine justice, although Isaac never does precisely that.
Most of us admire the individual who freely but judiciously forgives
persons without requiring compensation. A loving human father, for
example, can forgive his prodigal son without requiring recompence.
Similarly, a judge acting on behalf of the state can choose to pardon a contrite violator of the law or weaken the sentence given thereto. Mercies of
these kinds are not unjust. So why maintain that a perfectly just Godṣmust
exercise strong-retribution for uncompensated sins (even if something
else may be required, such as penance)?61 This question is particularly
acute when we add that the God who forgives the repentant also has the
ability to bring restoration between the victim and victimizer.62
Against such reflections, J. Angelo Corlett, in a recent defense of the
inexorability of something very much like divine strong-retribution,
argues that the notion that God can forgive freely is fraught with problems.
If it is thought that God has no perfect or absolute duty to punish sin, then
God is not obligated morally to punish anyone at all for any reason, leaving
open the possibility that God would forgive sin either on a case by case basis
for [reasons that] are her “own,” or even universally. However, this position on divine justice encounters Plato’s Socrates’s Euthyphro problem [. . .],
where divine justice might be changed with moral arbitrariness [. . .] what
justifies God’s punishing in some case but not in others?63

The challenge, then, for those who postulate that God is free to forgive
uncompensated sins is to provide one or more plausible principles that
guide God’s decisions as to when to forgive without being compensated
and when to punish.
Isaac has the conceptual resources to meet such a challenge, although
he does not address it directly. To simplify things, let us leave aside considerations where God’s decision concerning whether to forgive one
individual might be taken to have positive or negative implications for
others (which could be another means by which God acts non-arbitrarily
on this issue). Instead, let us focus on the manner in which God’s choice
of whether or not to forgive has implications for the wrongdoer. With that
in mind, Isaac could say that, given that God has chosen to create humans
for the sake of love, God always forgives freely (in part or whole), and
II/39, 2.
II/39, 14–17, passim.
61
For some biblical justification for appealing to human moral exemplars to understand
God’s moral character, see Luke 11:11–13 (cf. Matt. 5:44–48; Eph. 5:1–2; Phil. 2:1–8; 1 Jn. 4:7–11).
62
Helpful here is Talbott, “Punishment, Forgiveness, and Divine Justice,” 151–168.
63
Corlett, “Divine Justice and Human Sin,” 138.
59
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thus forgoes punishment (in part or whole), when (and to the degree to
which) He knows that doing so will be (or is likely to be) as good or better for the wrongdoer than it would be should God choose not to forgive
(in part or whole). Conversely, Isaac might say that God does not forgive
freely when (and to the degree to which) He knows that doing so will be
bad for the wrongdoer (e.g., increase the offender’s moral complacency).
In such circumstances, maybe God punishes in remedial ways. Were God
to operate in such a manner, it is plausible that God’s decisions would be
guided by good moral reasons, and thus His decisions regarding when to
forgive and when to punish (and to what degree) would not be arbitrary.
Again, while Isaac does not exactly postulate such principles related to
divine forgiveness, the point is that neither Isaac’s way of thinking nor the
Isaac-inspired AGP obviously rests upon the kind of moral arbitrariness
that Corlett would have us believe.64
The two Isaac-inspired responses I have offered to the Anselmian
Paradigm are both controversial and would require more development than they can be given presently. Nevertheless, it seems that
these responses minimally suggest that one may reasonably reject the
Anselmian Paradigm. For those who are willing to reject this paradigm on
the basis of such reasons, perhaps the most significant hurdle to adhering

to (2) has been removed. I submit, moreover, that the two responses to
the Anselmian Paradigm, working in concert with (1), p
 rovide indirect
support for (2). But, clearly, if (2) is accepted alongside the other premises
of the AGP, then (4) follows. In which case, one may affirm with Isaac that
God does not punish humans with strong-retribution.
Conclusion
It might be said that a sufficient condition for a good argument is one in
which an individual is justified in believing the conclusion of the argument on the basis of its premises. Whether the Isaac-inspired AGP meets
that threshold is left to the reader’s judgement—some, for instance, will
require greater attention to the details of Scripture. Whatever the judgement, I hope I have shown that in Isaac rests the seeds of an argument
for a significant conclusion that merits further discussion, namely, that
God, because of His creative purposes guided by tremendous love,
refuses to punish humans with the kind of retribution that amounts to
intentional-harm.65
Lindsey Wilson College
64
I trust that the reader is able to postulate additional divine action-guiding principles that
are compatible with Isaac’s basic way of thinking and circumvent Corlett’s charge of moral
arbitrariness.
65
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